Strona:Artur Schopenhauer - O wolności ludzkiej woli.djvu/200

go wydania, Birmingham, 1782., w celu scharakteryzowania jego wyników.
 131) Przedmowa, str. xx. „There is no absurdity more glaring to my understanding, than the notion of philosophical liberty.“ — Str. 26. „Without a miracle, or the Intervention of some foreign cause, no volition or action of any man could have been otherwise, than it has been.“ — Str. 37., Though an inchnation or affection of mind be not gravity, it influences me and acts upon me as certainly and necessarily, as this power does upon a stone.“ — Str. 43. „Saying that the will is selfdetermined, gives no idea at all, or rather implies an absurdity, viz: that a determination, which is an effect, takes place, whithout any cause at all. For exclusive of every thing that comes under the denomination of motive, there is really nothing at all left, to produce the determination. Let a man use what words he pleases, he can have no more conception how we can sometimes be determined by motives, and sometimes without any motive, than he can have of a scale being sometimes weighed down by weights, and sometimes by a kind of substance that has no weight at all, which, whatever it be in itself, must, with respect to the scale be nothing.“ — Str. 66. „In proper philosophical language, the motive ought to be call’d the proper cause of the action. It is as much so as any [458] thing in nature is the cause of any thing else.“ — Str. 84. „It will never be in our power to choose two things, when all the previous circumstances are the very same.“ — Str. 90. „A man indeed, when he reproaches himself for any particular action in his passed conduct, may fancy that, if he was in the same Situation again, he would have acted differently. But this is a mere deception; and if he examines himself strictly, and takes in all circumstances, he may be satisfied that with the same inward disposition of mind, and with precisely the same view of things, that he had then, and exclusive of all others, that he has acquired by reflection since, he could not